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Using rich data linking federal cases from arrest through to sentencing,
we find that initial case and defendant characteristics, including arrest
offense and criminal history, can explain most of the large raw racial
disparity in federal sentences, but significant gaps remain. Across the
distribution, blacks receive sentences that are almost 10 percent longer
than those of comparable whites arrested for the same crimes. Most of
this disparity can be explained by prosecutors’ initial charging decisions,
particularly the filing of charges carrying mandatory minimum sen-
tences. Ceteris paribus, the odds of black arrestees facing such a charge
are 1.75 times higher than those of white arrestees.
I. Introduction
Black men constitute 6 percent of the US adult population but are
approximately 35 percent of the prison population and are incarcerated
at a rate six times that of white males ðCarson and Sabol 2012Þ. One in
three black men will be incarcerated at some point in his life ðBonczar
2003Þ. The federal prison system is the largest and fastest-growing in the
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United States ðCongressional Research Service 2013Þ. Black male de-
fendants in federal criminal cases receive much longer prison sentences
than white men do ðfig. 1Þ. In federal courts, the average sentence
during 2008 and 2009 was 55 months for whites and 90 months for
blacks ðUS Sentencing Commission 2010Þ. The extent to which these
disparities reflect differences in criminal conduct as opposed to differ-
ential treatment is a long-standing question in law and economics. That
is, do otherwise similar black and white arrestees caught engaging in the
same criminal conduct receive different prison sentences?
A key empirical challenge in answering this question is the lack of data
on true criminal conduct. Of necessity, previous estimates of racial dis-
parity in prison sentences proxy for criminal conduct with a measure of
the severity of the crime of conviction: often the “presumptive sen-
tence,” which is the recommended sentence under the applicable sen-
tencing guidelines and takes account of aggravating and mitigating
“sentencing facts.” However, neither the crime of conviction nor the
presumptive sentence is an exogenous measure of criminal conduct.
Each is the product of highly discretionary and negotiated processes,
including charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing fact-finding. These
processes are carried out in expectation of their sentencing conse-
quences and potentially involve racial disparities of their own. Moreover,
since the existing literature relies on sentencing data, its samples consist
only of sentenced cases and thus potentially suffer from selection bias.
We address both limitations by constructing a linked multiagency data
set that follows federal cases from arrest through to sentencing. The data
cover the universe of black and white male US citizens who were arrested
for violent, property/fraud, weapons, and public order offenses and
referred to federal prosecutors for potential prosecution between fiscal
years 2006 and 2008.1 Using individual records from the US Marshals
Service ðwhich collects arrest dataÞ, federal prosecutors, federal courts,
and the US Sentencing Commission, we constructed a complete picture
of each individual’s path through the federal justice system. The detailed
arrest data provide a proxy for underlying conduct that ðwhile certainly
not perfectÞ is not distorted by discretionary charging, plea bargaining,
and fact-finding processes. Combining data from multiple agencies also
BrensikePrimus,AdamPritchard, Jeff Smith, SaraSun-Beale, andparticipants at theAmerican
Law and Economics Association, the American Society of Criminology, the Canadian Institute
for Advanced Research, the Canadian Labour Market and Skills Researcher Network, Duke,
Loyola, the National Sentencing Policy Institute, the National Bureau of Economic Research,
the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, and the University of Michigan for extremely helpful
comments. Seth Kingery, Sharon Brett, Ryan Gersovitz, Matthew Lee, Sabrina Speianu, and
Daniel Shack provided valuable research assistance.
1 Themain estimates exclude other categories of crimes ðmost notably drugsÞ because of
data limitations. More limited analyses of broader samples, including drug cases, find
similar racial disparity patterns.
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provides a rich picture of the characteristics of the offender and the
offense. These data allow us to compare the sentencing outcomes for
black and white men who are arrested for the same offenses and appear
comparable when they enter the federal justice system. We thus estimate
the extent to which observed racial disparities in federal sentences can
be explained by differences in arrest offense characteristics and pre-
existing defendant characteristics such as criminal history.
FIG. 1.—Distribution of prison sentences by race ðmonthsÞ
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Using quantile regressions, we estimate the size of racial disparity
across the conditional sentencing distribution. We find that the majority
of the disparity between black and white sentences can be explained by
differences in legally permitted characteristics, in particular, the arrest
offense and the defendant’s criminal history. Black arrestees are also
disproportionately concentrated in federal districts that have higher
sentences in general. Yet even after we control for these and other prior
characteristics, an unexplained black-white sentence disparity of approx-
imately 9 percent remains in our main sample. The disparity is nearly
13 percent in a broader sample that includes drug cases. Estimates of
the conditional effect of being black on sentences are robust, fairly
stable across the deciles, and economically significant. There are ap-
proximately 95,000 black men in federal prisons. Eliminating the “black
premium” that we identify would reduce the steady-state level of black
men in federal prison by 8,000–11,000 men and save $230–$320 million
per year in direct costs.
Observing each case from arrest through to sentencing makes it
possible to pinpoint where unexplained disparities emerge in the judi-
cial process. We identify an important procedural mechanism that ap-
pears to give rise to the majority of the otherwise-unexplained disparity
in sentences: how prosecutors initially choose to handle the case, in
particular, the decision to bring charges carrying “mandatory minimum”
sentences. The racial disparities in this decision are stark: ceteris pa-
ribus, black men have 1.75 times the odds of facing such charges, which
is equivalent to a 5 percentage point ðor 65 percentÞ increase in the
probability for the average defendant. The initial mandatory minimum
charging decision alone is capable of explaining more than half of the
black-white sentence disparities not otherwise explained by precharge
characteristics.
These differences in initial charging highlight the importance of
using proxies for alleged criminal conduct that are not themselves a
product of the federal judicial process. Sentence disparity estimates that
condition on the presumptive sentence or other features of the crime of
conviction are problematic because those measures are determined
through discretionary processes and negotiations that may contain
racial disparities. By focusing on the judge’s final sentencing decision in
isolation, the existing empirical literature has overlooked the role of
prosecutors, whose decisions substantially shape sentences. Prosecutors
enjoy very broad discretion to choose charges and to negotiate plea
agreements, which often include stipulations of the facts on which
sentences and presumptive sentences are based.
Charges carrying statutory mandatory minimum sentences are pros-
ecutors’ most powerful tool to constrain sentences, and disparities in the
use of that tool can translate powerfully into sentence disparities. The
racial disparity in federal criminal sentences 1323
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importance of mandatory minimum charges in explaining sentence
disparities is particularly striking because the crimes covered by this
analysis have a relatively low prevalence of such charges ðwe identify such
charges for 7.5 percent and 16.5 percent of white and black arrestees,
respectivelyÞ. For many offenses, mandatory minimums are simply not
a prosecutorial option. Yet disparities in the initial charging of a mi-
nority of cases appear capable of explaining the majority of otherwise-
unexplained black-white sentence disparities in the pool as a whole.
Moreover, our estimates likely underestimate the role of mandatory
minimums because of the use of highly conservative coding assumptions
when charge data were ambiguous. Analyses using alternative data on
mandatory minimums suggest that their use can explain virtually all of
the otherwise unexplained sentencing disparity.
II. Institutional Background and Existing Literature
A. Institutional Background
In the federal system, approximately 97 percent of convictions are the
product of guilty pleas. US federal prosecutors ðlike state prosecutorsÞ
possess enormous discretion. That discretion begins with the initial choice
of what, if any, charges to bring. The federal criminal code is vast, and the
definitions of crimes in the code often overlap, giving prosecutors a wide
menu of charging options in a given case. Moreover, prosecutors must
subjectively assess the strength of evidence and choose how to characterize
ambiguous facts. For instance, if a gun is found in the car that transported
a defendant to a burglary, the prosecutor must decide whether to allege
that the burglary legally qualified as a “crime of violence” ð18 U.S.C §16Þ,
that the gun qualified as a “firearm,” and that the defendant “carried” it
“during and in relation to” the burglary—all of which are necessary to
trigger a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. §924ðcÞ,
which would run consecutively to the burglary sentence. A lenient prose-
cutor might choose to “swallow the gun” and just charge burglary.
While initial charges can be amended as the prosecutor prepares the
case or as a result of a plea agreement, the initial charges are still critical.
The prosecutor enjoys essentially unilateral legal decision-making au-
thority over initial charges,2 whereas subsequent plea deals must be
agreed to by defendants ðunder counsel’s adviceÞ.3 Moreover, the initial
charge is usually the final charge,4 in part because Department of Justice
2 Although felony indictments are issued by grand juries on prosecutorial request, this is a
mere formality; prosecutors get the charges they seek in 99.9 percent of cases ðSkolnik 1999Þ.
3 The initial charges are, of course, thefirstmove ina strategic gameand are therefore likely
to be chosen taking into account expectations of judicial behavior and the defendant’s bar-
gaining position.
4 The lead charge is identical at the initial and final stages in about 85 percent of cases in
our sample.
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policy discourages subsequent “charge bargaining.”5 Instead, plea bar-
gaining often focuses on sentence recommendations and factual stipu-
lations concerning aggravating and mitigating factors that will influence
the sentence. The initial charges are the starting point for bargaining over
all these terms. For this reason, the prosecutor’s choice to bring particu-
larly severe initial charges ðsuch as those carrying mandatory minimumsÞ
can adversely affect outcomes for defendants evenwhen the severe charges
are reduced in plea bargaining; the threat of the initial chargesmay induce
the defendant to plead guilty on less favorable terms.
Once a plea agreement is reached, the case is referred to the judge for
sentencing. At that point a probation officer compiles a presentence
investigation report on the defendant ðwhich includes the defendant’s
full criminal historyÞ for the judge to use in sentencing.6 Criminal stat-
utes define extremely wide sentencing ranges for each crime. For
example, the criminal code states that an individual convicted of com-
puter fraud can receive a sentence ranging from 0 to 30 years in prison
ðthe statutory rangeÞ. From 1987 to 2005, judges were required to sen-
tence defendants in accordance with the US Sentencing Guidelines. The
guidelines are essentially a point system that specifies where a defendant
should be placed within the wide statutory range. They thus limited
judicial discretion to narrow sentencing ranges on the basis of factors
mainly determined by plea agreements ðthe charges of conviction and
the aggravating and mitigating “sentencing facts”Þ along with the de-
fendant’s prior criminal history. Judges are not legally bound by the
factual stipulations in plea agreements. However, most federal judges
report that if the parties have agreed to a particular version of the facts,
they typically defer to it, with the result that sentencing fact-finding, too,
is to a large degree negotiated in the plea agreement ðGilbert and
Johnson 1996; Schulhofer and Nagel 1997Þ.
In 2005, the Supreme Court’s Booker decision rendered the guidelines
merely advisory, potentially weakening prosecutors’ sentencing influ-
ence. But judges must still consult the guidelines,7 and Booker did not
affect the binding nature of sentencing statutes. Some criminal statutes
specify “mandatory minimum” sentences ðwhich are often quite highÞ,
and even after Booker, prosecutors can tie judges’ hands by bringing such
5 In 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memo ordering prosecutors to get
special approval for charge reductions ðAshcroft 2003Þ. The Ashcroft memo also ordered
that the initial charge be the “most serious” offense that is “readily provable”; if obeyed, this
would have essentially eliminated charging discretion. But this part of the policy contained
no special supervision requirements and may have been unenforceable in practice ðMiller
2004; Stith 2008Þ; it was modified in 2010.
6 The criminal history used in this analysis comes from this report. While federal pros-
ecutors may often have a general knowledge of the defendant’s criminal record well before
sentencing, a full criminal history is not officially compiled and added to the file until
sentencing.
7 See 18 U.S.C. §3553. The guidelines thus remain a key reference point ðScott 2010;
Bushway, Owens, and Piehl ½2012 find that state advisory guidelines influence sentencesÞ.
racial disparity in federal criminal sentences 1325
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charges. Parole was abolished in the federal system in 1987. Without a
successful appeal ðwhich is rareÞ, the sentence conferred by the judge is
the sentence served, subject to small, automatic reductions for good
behavior in prison.8
B. Existing Literature
Legal scholars, judges, and practitioners broadly agree that prosecuto-
rial decisions play a dominant role in determining sentences ðsee, e.g.,
Gilbert and Johnson 1996; Miller 2004; Stith 2008Þ. In spite of this, prior
empirical studies of racial and other demographic disparities in sen-
tencing have considered judicial sentencing decisions only in isolation
from the prosecutorial choices that preceded them. For instance, fed-
eral sentencing studies typically rely on Sentencing Commission ðUSSCÞ
data alone and estimate disparities in the final sentence conditional on
the “presumptive sentence,” usually defined as the bottom of the
guidelines range, as well as the statutory mandatory minimum. Estimates
using this approach vary, but most find disparities favoring whites ðsee
Mustard ½2001 for a review of the earlier literature and Ulmer, Light,
and Kramer ½2011, US Sentencing Commission ½2012, and Nowacki
½2013 for some recent examplesÞ. Fischman and Schanzenbach ð2012Þ
use the “base offense level” under the guidelines to proxy for criminal
conduct and also find substantial disparities favoring whites.9
Estimates of sentence disparity that condition on the presumptive
guidelines sentence produce, in effect, a measure of racial disparity in
judges’ formaladherence to theguidelines.This isnot,however, equivalent
to estimating the disparity introduced by judges at sentencing because the
judicial sentencing process also includes the fact-finding that helps to
determine the guidelines range. The guidelines range is itself the product
of decision making by the parties, including initial charging as well as
plea bargaining over charges and stipulations of “sentencing facts.” All of
this decision making is carried out in anticipation of its sentencing con-
sequences and is potentially subject to racial disparities. Policy makers as
well as defendants themselves are likely interested not just in disparities
in guidelines adherence but in the disparity in outcomes among offend-
ers with the same underlying conduct and criminal history. If that is the
quantity of interest, estimates that condition on the presumptive sentence
ðor variants of itÞ are likely to be biased.
8 Federal prisoners who do not commit other crimes or major disciplinary infractions
while in prison automatically receive “good time” credits. Individuals sentenced to more
than 1 year in prison earn 54 days of good time for every 365 days in prison, such that they
serve only 87 percent of their sentences ð18 U.S.C. §3624Þ.
9 The base offense level is determined prior to part of the Sentencing Guidelines fact-
finding process, but it is still determined by the crime of conviction and some initial findings
of fact by the judge.
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The limited existing literature on racial disparity in prosecutorial
decision making does not estimate its sentencing consequences. There
are almost no studies of racial disparities in initial charge severity. One
exception is the study by Miethe ð1987Þ, who found significant dis-
parities favoring whites in a small sample of Minnesota cases. The few
studies of disparities in plea bargaining generally find that prosecutors
favor white defendants ðsee Shermer and Johnson ½2010 for a reviewÞ,
but these studies are generally limited to deviations from the initial
charges the prosecutor chose, treating the initial charge as exogenous.
Finally, black defendants receive statutory “mandatory minimum” sen-
tences more frequently than whites do, suggesting that these charges
may be an important mechanism for sentencing disparities ðUS Sen-
tencing Commission 2011; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012Þ. How-
ever, the existing studies that document this disparity do not answer the
crucial question of why blacks more frequently face mandatory mini-
mum sentences: differences in underlying crime patterns and criminal
histories, or disparate exercise of prosecutorial charging discretion?
Doing so requires charge and arrest data, which prior sentencing re-
searchers have not had.
Prosecutors do not simply always seek to maximize a defendant’s
potential sentence. Prosecutorial discretion is essentially the power to be
lenient, and prosecutors might choose to be lenient for a variety of rea-
sons. Incentives shaping prosecutorial choices include pressure to max-
imize convictions or sentences, career concerns, resource constraints,
and the desire to reduce workload and risk by encouraging guilty pleas
ðe.g., Landes 1971; Easterbrook 1983; Kessler and Piehl 1998; Glaeser,
Kessler, and Piehl 2000; Baker and Mezzetti 2001Þ. Prosecutors may be
motivated by sympathy or a sense of fairness. Schulhofer and Nagel
ð1997Þ reviewed federal prosecutors’ case files and found that they often
manipulated charges to avoid sentencing consequences that were per-
ceived as excessively harsh. Similarly, Bjerk ð2005Þ finds evidence that
state prosecutors manipulate charges to avoid triggering three-strikes
laws. Selective leniency or empathy is one possible mechanism behind
racial disparity in sentences. Linder ð1996Þ, Goette, Huffman, and Meier
ð2006Þ, and Fong and Luttmer ð2009Þ provide evidence of own-group
bias or empathy in settings ranging from charitable giving to jury service.
III. Data
A. Sample
This study uses dyadic linking files provided by the Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics to merge data from the USMarshals’ Service ðUSMSÞ, the Executive
Office of the US Attorneys ðEOUSAÞ, the Administrative Office of the US
racial disparity in federal criminal sentences 1327
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Courts ðAOUSCÞ, and the US Sentencing Commission. The sample con-
sists of male US citizens who were arrested and had cases referred to pros-
ecutors from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2008.10 The time period
was chosen to ensure that all cases were processed entirely after the 2005
Booker decision but early enough to allow sufficient time for virtually all
of them to have been resolved before the end of fiscal year 2009, the last
year of available data.11 Since Booker gave judges the most sentencing dis-
cretion they had in decades, these years likely involve less prosecutorial
influence over sentencing than earlier years.
The principal sample consists of property and fraud crimes, weapons
offenses, regulatory offenses, and violent crimes ðtable 1Þ. Immigration
cases and other cases involving noncitizens were excluded because the
stakes in those cases center on deportation, making them not directly
comparable to other crimes. We also excluded traffic and liquor offenses,
which are typically disposed of as “petty offenses”: minor infractions that
are not subject to the Sentencing Guidelines and are usually dealt with via
citations that carry fines.12 Limitations in the arrest offense and initial
charge data necessitated the exclusion of drug and child pornography
cases from themain analysis, although they are included in supplementary
analyses.13 The sample is further restricted to cases from the 50 US states
and the District of Columbia. Further details are provided in the online
data appendix.14
After these exclusions, the sample consists of 36,659 individuals who
were arrested and referred to the US Attorney’s Offices for possible
prosecution in fiscal years 2006–8 ðinclusiveÞ. Figure 2 shows the dispo-
sitions of these cases. Prosecutors chose not to file any charges in 790 cases
ð2 percentÞ. In 2,647 cases ð7 percentÞ, prosecutors filed charges, but the
10 For convenience, we refer to members of the sample as “arrestees” and the offense
information as the “arrest offense.” However, the sample also includes those who surrendered
to avoid arrest, and the same data are available for these individuals. The analysis is limited to
men because both racial disparity and criminal offense patterns differ substantially by gender
ðStarr 2012Þ. Over 80 percent of federal defendants were male during this period.
11 We estimate that fewer than 0.5 percent of cases initiated within this period were still
pending at the end of 2009 ðsee the online data appendixÞ.
12 Such offenses would normally be routine state or local infractions but for their
occurrence on federal land. Traffic and liquor offenses are usually merely tickets ðWarner
2004Þ, and those that are paid by mail do not appear at all in the federal data sets that we
use; thus, only a highly selected sample of these infractions appear in the federal data.
13 Drug quantity, a critical fact for offense severity, is not recorded in the initial charge data.
Similarly, the child pornography charge data do not distinguish “receipt” from “possession”;
only the former carries a highmandatory minimum sentence.
14 The data appendix details additional exclusions intended to eliminate files opened and
then immediately closed because of administrative errors, records that would otherwise have
been double counted in the sample ðbecause when records are transferred between districts,
two records are created on the same caseÞ, and defendants who died before completion of the
case. It also describes exclusions of cases in which the outcomes could not be determined,
primarily because they were transferred to other prosecuting authorities, as well as analyses we
conducted to ensure that results are robust to alternative treatments of these cases.
1328 journal of political economy
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Main Sample
Black White
Mean
Standard
Deviation Mean
Standard
Deviation
Percent
Recorded
Defendant characteristics:
Age ðyearsÞ 32.317 10.145 38.63 12.850 100
Criminal history:
Category 1 20.43 40.31 44.97 49.75 89
Category 2 9.00 28.62 9.61 29.47 89
Category 3 17.34 37.86 13.15 33.79 89
Category 4 16.63 37.24 9.34 29.10 89
Category 5 11.41 31.80 6.95 25.43 89
Category 6 25.18 43.41 15.98 36.64 89
Education:
High school dropout 42.99 49.5 29.16 45.5 87
High school graduate 17.76 38.2 21.38 41.0 87
GED/vocational certificate 20.1 40.1 20.62 40.5 87
At least some college 19.15 39.3 28.84 45.3 87
Appointed counsel 84.46 36.23 60.27 48.94 38
County poverty rate 14.87 5.4 13.89 5.72 93
County income ð$Þ 21,011 4,619 20,488 5,115 93
County violent crime rate .007 .004 .005 .003 93
Case characteristics:
Multiple defendants 25.4 43.5 27.3 44.6 100
Offense type:
Violent offenses 13.01 33.64 11.19 31.52 100
Property offenses 25.67 43.68 39.8 48.95 100
Regulatory offenses 5.75 23.29 14.62 35.33 100
Weapons offenses 55.57 49.69 34.4 47.5 100
Any aggravating factors in
arrest notes 59.65 49.06 43.15 49.53 49
Charge characteristics:
Any charges filed 97.8 14.8 97.9 14.3 100
Mandatory minimum
charges filed 16.4 37.0 7.5 26.4 100
Case resolution:
Any conviction 90.7 29.1 90.6 29.2 100
Nonpetty conviction 90.25 29.67 89.56 30.58 100
Sentenced for an offense with
a mandatory minimum 21.3 40.9 9.54 29.4 100
Any incarceration 79.7 40.2 67.7 46.8 100
Sentence length ðmonthsÞ 64.89 81.71 38.09 60.76 100
Observations 16,143 20,516
Note.—Unless specifically noted otherwise, the means are the percentage of arrestees
with the listed characteristics. The difference in black and white means is significant at the
1 percent level for all variables except the percentage of arrestees with criminal history
category 2 ðp5 .06Þ, a GED ðp5 .26Þ, any charges filed ðp5 .38Þ, any conviction ðp5 .68Þ,
and any nonpetty conviction ðp5 .03Þ. Percent recorded is the percentage of arrestees for
which that variable is available ðnonmissingÞ in the data.
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 09:05:24 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
case ended either in acquittal or with a complete dismissal of the charges.
Less than 1 percent of the cases were disposed of as petty offenses. Ap-
proximately 90 percent of arrests in the sample resulted in convictions
for nonpetty offenses, and four-fifths of these convictions resulted in in-
carceration.15 The average sentence length among those incarcerated was
64 months, and the average sentence faced by all arrestees was 50 months.
B. Case and Defendant Characteristics
The USMS data and the EOUSA data from the prosecutor’s investigation
file are available for all sample members. The district of arrest, arrest of-
fense, and key demographic information ðdefendant’s age, marital status,
race, gender, and citizenshipÞ are all drawn from the USMS data. The
USMS records five race categories: white, black, Asian, Native American,
and other/unknown; the last three groups, which collectively constitute
approximately 5 percent of arrestees, are too small to analyze separately
and are excluded. Hispanic ethnicity is not a category in the USMS data.
Hispanics are therefore included in the white and black groups.16
15 Our sample includes 26,676 nonpetty convictions resulting in incarceration and 6,267
nonpetty convictions resulting in alternative sentences such as probation or fines.
16 Hispanic ethnicity is recorded by the USSC and is included in alternative analyses below
but is excluded from the main analysis because it is not available for all defendants. In the
subsample of cases recorded by the USSC, approximately 16 percent of defendants listed as
white by the USMS data are identified as Hispanic in the USSC data. Only 1 percent of
defendants classified as black in the USMS data are identified as Hispanic by the USSC.
FIG. 2.—Disposition of federal arrests
1330 journal of political economy
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TheUSMS uses over 400 arrest offense codes to categorize the offenses
recorded by the arresting officers. We condensed these into 134 groups,
combining codes used in very few cases with similar codes that describe
the same legal offense. The arrest offense represents the closest proxy
available for the defendant’s actual underlying criminal conduct, albeit
an imperfect one, as discussed further below. The arrest offense is also a
proxy for the information about the alleged criminal conduct that is
available to the prosecutor at the time of charging. For arrests that
occurred in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, it is possible to supplement the
arrest offense with information from a text field with a written offense
description recorded by the USMS on the basis of the arresting officer’s
notes. In addition, all analyses include an indicator for whether the
investigation targeted multiple people, constructed on the basis of pros-
ecutors’ investigation files. Multiperson cases often involve alleged con-
spiracies with more serious charges.
The offender’s education and criminal history category ðas categorized
under the Sentencing GuidelinesÞ were also included in the main anal-
yses. These variables come from the USSC’s data and are available only
for those sentenced for nonpetty offenses.17 It was therefore necessary to
impute the criminal history and education for the 3,716 arrestees for
whom this information was not available ðapproximately 10 percent of
the sampleÞ.18 Our preferred imputation method is the “hot deck” ap-
proach commonly used in government surveys such as the Current Pop-
ulation Survey ðAndridge and Little 2010Þ. Each individual with missing
education and criminal history is assigned the education and criminal
history values from another sample member who perfectly matches him
on race, arrest offense, 5-year age groups, andmarital status. Nearly every
individual had at least one exact match,19 and the median arrestee with
unobserved criminal history had 151 exact matches. In cases with more
than one exact match ð99 percent of the observationsÞ, we employ a
random hot deck method ðAndridge and Little 2010Þ. A single donor
individual is selected at random from among the arrestee’s exactmatches
and his education and criminal history values are used. This procedure
was repeated 15 times with different random draws. Across all the anal-
yses described below, the “black” coefficient was invariant to the indi-
vidual selected at random from among the matches: the estimates across
imputations differed only in the third or fourth decimal place. We report
17 This includes everyone who is found guilty or pleads guilty to an offense covered by
the guidelines, including those who are not sentenced to any incarceration.
18 Criminal history and education were not available for the 790 individuals who were
arrested but never charged with a crime, the 735 defendants charged only with petty
offenses, and the 2,191 who were charged but not convicted of nonpetty offenses ðthese are
individuals who either were acquitted or had their cases dropped or dismissedÞ.
19 The 99 individuals for whom no matching individual could be found were excluded.
These were predominantly individuals who were arrested for extremely rare offenses.
racial disparity in federal criminal sentences 1331
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the coefficients and their associated standard errors from the hot deck
draw that produces the median black point estimate among the 15 hot
deck draws.
Additional measures of the defendants’ socioeconomic status are
available for subsamples of defendants and are employed in supple-
mentary analyses. The court records the county for all arrestees against
whom charges are filed. County-level economic variables ðper capita in-
come, unemployment rate, and poverty rateÞ along with the violent crime
rate per 1,000 county residents were constructed by linking AOUSC
county fields to data from the 2000 census and from the 2007–9 Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports. The court also re-
cords the defendant’s counsel type. This is a strong proxy for poverty
because the government provides counsel only for indigent defendants.
Counsel type is not recorded in 62 percent of cases, however, and is
therefore excluded from the primary analysis.
Sentence length, the primary outcome of interest, comes from the
USSC data. For individuals not included in the USSC data ðprimarily
those in petty offense casesÞ, we relied on the sentencing information
from the prosecutor ðEOUSAÞ and court files ðAOUSCÞ. The 9 percent
of individuals who did not receive a sentence at all because they were
never charged or not convicted were assigned an incarceration length of
zero, as were the 18 percent of cases in which the defendant was con-
victed but not sentenced to any incarceration.
As discussed above, prosecutors’ decisions are a potentially over-
looked factor in black-white sentence disparities. In order to determine
whether prosecutorial charging is capable of explaining the otherwise-
unexplained disparities, we constructed measures of the severity of ini-
tial and final charges. AOUSC records up to five charges at the filing
stage and five at the termination stage. However, the AOUSC data do not
reliably code the severity of these charges beyond the felony-misdemeanor
distinction.20 Instead, they record the section of the criminal code a defen-
dant is charged with violating ðe.g., 18 U.S.C. §924½cÞ. We therefore de-
velop and apply our own severity measures to translate the initial charges
and their combinations into a defendant’s sentencing exposure. These
measures are based on detailed legal research into the sentencing law gov-
erning every federal crime and combination of crimes charged during
the study period.
Our principal measures—the statutory maximum sentence and an
indicator for whether a statutory mandatory minimum sentence is asso-
ciated with the defendant’s initial charges—have several theoretical ad-
20 The AOUSC does list a “severity code” that is purportedly based on the statutory
maximum, but it is often misleading, as explained further in the data appendix.
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vantages. After Booker, the statute provides the only firm legal constraints
on sentencing. The statutory maximum and any mandatory minimums
define the defendant’s sentencing exposure. The statutory maximum
associated with the initial charges is effectively the worst possible outcome
potentially faced by the defendant going into plea bargaining. A limitation
of the statutorymaximum is that statutory ranges are often extremely wide,
and the maximum is typically a large overestimate of the ultimate sen-
tence. As for the statutory minimum, most criminal statutes set out sen-
tencing ranges that start at zero; that is, there is no mandatory minimum
period of incarceration. But when a charge carrying a “mandatory mini-
mum” is brought, it can powerfully affect the sentence. After Booker,
mandatory minimums are the prosecutor’s only way to bind the judge to a
higher sentence.
The construction of these measures is limited by the precision of the
AOUSC’s recorded charges, which sometimes encompass multiple
subprovisions with different expected sentences. Whenever there were
ambiguities concerning the presence of a mandatory minimum, we
assumed that there was none, a very conservative assumption that led us
to underestimate the ability of prosecutorial decisions to explain sen-
tencing disparities.21 The AOUSC data are the only available source of
information about the mandatory minimum associated with the initial
charges. However, the sentencing judge records whether the final con-
viction is under a statute triggering a mandatory minimum sentence.
This field is recorded in the USSC data and is not subject to ambiguity.
In addition, while the initial charge data from AOUSC are ambiguous in
drug and child pornography cases, the USSC reliably records whether a
mandatory minimum was applicable to the final charges for those cases.
Summary statistics by race for all the variables described above are
provided in table 1. There is no racial difference in the raw probability of
conviction ðapproximately 91 percent of black and white arrestees are
ultimately convictedÞ, but black defendants are more likely to be incar-
cerated and face longer sentences when incarcerated. Nearly 80 percent
of black arrestees are incarcerated, compared with only 68 percent of
white arrestees, and black arrestees’ sentences are, on average, over 2 years
ð70 percentÞ longer. However, these differences may not be solely the
result of race. The black and white defendant pools differ on two key
legally relevant dimensions. First, black defendants, on average, have
more extensive criminal histories: only 20 percent of black defendants are
in the lowest criminal history category compared with 45 percent of white
21 Mandatory minimums are often triggered by facts that the AOUSC charge data do not
capture. Further details on the construction of the charge severity measures, including the
way we employed legal research and the assumptions we made to resolve these ambiguities,
are contained in the data appendix.
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defendants. Second, there are differences in the distribution of arrest
offenses. Table 1 contains the distributionof arrestees across broadoffense
categories. For example, black defendants are more likely than white de-
fendants to be arrested for weapons offenses. Black arrestees are alsomore
likely to have at least one aggravating factor noted in the written descrip-
tion of the arrest offense. In addition, there are differences in observables
that, while not legally relevant, could be correlated with case outcomes, in
particular, socioeconomic status. Black arrestees are more likely to be
sufficiently poor to qualify for a publicly funded attorney ð84 percent
compared with 60 percentÞ, and 43 percent of black arrestees are high
school dropouts compared with only 29 percent of whites. These differ-
ences in defendant and case characteristics could explain at least part of
the observed disparities in sentences and incarceration.
IV. Estimation and Results
A. Charging and Disposition of Cases
We begin by estimating racial disparities in how cases are treated in and
progress through the criminal justice process. The decision points
include the types of charges faced, conviction, and incarceration. These
case outcomes are of interest in their own rights and could contribute to
sentencing disparity. In particular, these analyses examine potential
disparities in the treatment of less serious offenses, those in which there
is a question of whether the defendant will be incarcerated at all.
Accordingly, we estimate logistic regressions of the form
PrðY 5 1jblack; X Þ5 e
ða1bblack1XgÞ
11 e ða1bblack1XgÞ
; ð1Þ
in which Y is the binary outcome of interest, black is a dummy for whether
the defendant is black, and X is a vector of additional offender and case
characteristics that are already determined at or before the time of arrest:
arrest offense, the defendant’s age, criminal history, education, and an
indicator for whether the investigation targeted multiple persons ðhere-
inafter the “multidefendant flag”Þ. The vector X also includes federal
district dummies to control for any differences in policy or decision mak-
ing, and standard errors are clustered by federal district in order to ac-
count for possible correlated shocks.22
Table 2 contains the resulting odds-ratio estimates for the full sample
of arrestees. Black arrestees are slightly less likely to face any federal
charges: the average probability of charges for white arrestees is 97.9 per-
22 The federal judicial districts are the unit of organization for the judiciary, the prose-
cutor’s offices, and the public defender’s offices.
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cent, while the estimated probability for comparable black arrestees is
97.6 percent.23However, there is a dramatic disparity disfavoring blacks in
the likelihood of facing severe charges. All else equal, black arrestees are
TABLE 2
Odds of Charging, Conviction, and Incarceration
Any
Charge
ð1Þ
Mandatory
Minimum
Charge
ð2Þ
Any
Conviction
ð3Þ
Nonpetty
Conviction
ð4Þ
Mandatory
Minimum
Conviction
ð5Þ
Any
Incarceration
ð6Þ
Black .8381 1.752** .8961 .926 1.724** 1.003
½.084 ½.120 ½.057 ½.055 ½.118 ½.040
Age .993* .973** .987** .988** .971** .989**
½.003 ½.002 ½.002 ½.002 ½.003 ½.001
Multiple
defendants .653** 1.805** .787** .804** 1.64** 1.009
½.065 ½.108 ½.051 ½.051 ½.104 ½.041
Criminal
history 2 1.108 1.375** 1.104 .921 1.327** 1.871**
½.149 ½.112 ½.077 ½.072 ½.124 ½.082
Criminal
history 3 .969 1.185 .974 .960 1.170 2.511**
½.153 ½.105 ½.063 ½.055 ½.114 ½.119
Criminal
history 4 .916 1.028 .957 .918 1.055 3.671**
½.144 ½.104 ½.071 ½.070 ½.114 ½.185
Criminal
history 5 1.003 1.125 .932 .947 1.052 4.331**
½.178 ½.124 ½.082 ½.077 ½.121 ½.327
Criminal
history 6 .862 1.351* .976 .905 1.231 4.894**
½.129 ½.141 ½.083 ½.074 ½.146 ½.373
High school
graduate .917 1.010 .962 .948 .992 .832**
½.110 ½.054 ½.064 ½.055 ½.060 ½.032
GED/
vocational .971 1.008 .978 .952 .951 .928
½.100 ½.057 ½.064 ½.059 ½.077 ½.041
At least some
college .938 .973 1.033 .979 .897 .954
½.099 ½.062 ½.067 ½.051 ½.065 ½.035
Observations 34,804 35,320 36,482 36,601 34,872 36,659
Note.—Odds ratios are from logistic regressions with standard errors block boot-
strapped by district in brackets. The odds ratios reported are from the hot deck imputation
of criminal history and education that produces the median black odds ratio across the 15
hot deck imputations of criminal history and education. All regressions also include
dummy variables for the arrest offense and the federal district. Observations differ across
outcomes because of the perfect prediction of the outcome by a handful of arrest offenses.
1 Significant at the 10 percent level.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
23 These estimates and the ones that follow in themain text are calculated using the odds
ratios in table 2 and the base probabilities in table 1. Alternatively, calculating the average
racial disparity in federal criminal sentences 1335
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 09:05:24 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
much more likely to initially face a charge carrying a mandatory mini-
mum ð7.5 percent for the average white arrestee compared to 12.4 per-
cent for a comparable black arrestee; col. 2Þ and to be convicted of such
charges ð4.5 percent for white arrestees, 7.5 percent for comparable black
arrestees; col. 5Þ.24
Turning to the overall probability of conviction, there is a slight and
marginally significant disparity favoring black arrestees ð90.6 percent for
the average white arrestee vs. 89.6 percent for a comparable black
arrestee; table 2, col. 3Þ.25 This disparity seems to be driven primarily by
petty offense convictions; there is no significant disparity in the proba-
bility that an arrestee is convicted of a nonpetty offense ðcol. 4Þ. Despite
the sizable raw differences in incarceration rates, there is no unex-
plained racial disparity in the probability of incarceration after account-
ing for defendant and case characteristics ðcol. 6Þ.
B. Aggregate Disparities in the Distribution of Sentence Lengths
We now turn to our principal focus: the estimation of racial disparity in
sentence lengths. We estimate quantile regressions of the form
Q v½lnðSÞ5 av 1 bvblack1 Xg; ð2Þ
where S is the length of incarceration in months, black is an indicator for
whether the defendant is black, and v denotes the quantile of interest.
The term X is a set of additional defendant and case characteristics that
varies across specifications as described below. The term bv is the coef-
ficient of interest and is the marginal effect of race on the v percentile of
the sentence distribution. Standard errors are calculated by block
bootstrapping each estimate by district 100 times.26
Incarceration is the outcome of interest, and acquittals, dismissals, and
purely monetary or probationary sentences all result in zero incarcer-
ation. We treat all the nonincarceration outcomes as the equivalent of
24 Calculating the AME by averaging over the individual marginal effects ðas in fn. 23Þ
produces nearly identical estimates. The AME of being black is then a 4.9 ðSE 0.6Þ and 3.4
ðSE 0.4Þ percentage point increase in the probability of facing mandatory minimum
charges and being convicted of them, respectively.
25 Averaging over the individual marginal effects ðas in fn. 23Þ results in an AME of 0.9
ðSE 0.5Þ.
26 Iterations of up to 200 bootstrap loops produced point estimates and standard errors
that were equivalent to the fourth decimal place.
marginal effects ðAMEÞ of being black by averaging over themarginal effect of race on each
individual arrestee’s estimated probability of facing charges when evaluated at the true
values of the other covariates for that individual produces nearly identical estimates ða 0.4
percentage point decrease in the probability of facing charges; standard error ½SE 0.2,
calculated using the delta methodÞ.
1336 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 09:05:24 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1-month sentences.27 An advantage of the quantile regression approach
is that the estimates of the conditional quantiles substantially above the
affected portion of the distribution are robust to this valuation deci-
sion ðBloomfield and Steiger 1983; Powell 1986; Johnson, Kitamura,
and Neal 2000; Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer 2006Þ. After the impu-
tation, 27.6 percent of arrestees have 1-month sentences, and we there-
fore begin our estimation at the fourth decile.28
Table 3 presents the quantile regression estimates. Row 1 contains the
large raw racial disparities in incarceration length at each decile, with no
covariates. Row 2 adds controls for the primary offense characteristics to
the quantile regressions: the arrest offense and the multidefendant
indicator. Row 3 adds the most important predetermined characteristic
of the arrestee: criminal history, which, along with offense severity, is the
primary factor that federal judges are directed by the Sentencing
Guidelines to consider. Finally, row 4 adds other factors that, while not
legally relevant, are potentially correlated with race and could influence
the sentence: age, education, and judicial district. The resulting esti-
mates of bv are the amount of racial disparity in sentences after condi-
tioning on arrest offense and other precharge covariates, representing
the aggregate unexplained disparity in sentences that appears to be
introduced via the postarrest justice process.
The majority, but not all, of the raw disparity can be explained by the
legally relevant variables. After the inclusion of the arrest offense and
multidefendant flag, the unexplained black-white sentence disparity at
the median is only 34 percent and ranges from 24 to 34 percent across
the deciles ðrow 2Þ. After the inclusion of criminal history, the condi-
tional effect of race ranges from only 13 to 16 percent ðrow 3Þ. Taken
together, the legally relevant factors are capable of explaining most of
the observed racial disparity in sentences. Following the inclusion of the
additional demographic and geographic covariates ðeducation, age, and
judicial districtÞ, the estimated disparity falls further to 8–10 percent
ðrow 4Þ. The inclusion of the district is primarily responsible for this
reduction. It appears that sentences for all defendants are more severe
in the federal districts in which black arrestees are concentrated.
However, even after the inclusion of all the aforementioned factors,
significant racial disparities favoring whites remain at every decile. In
addition, after conditioning on the observed characteristics, race ap-
27 Assigning some nonzero value to nonincarceration sentences was necessary to enable
log transformation. In the ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ regression shown in App. table A1,
they are valued as zeroes instead and sentences are not log transformed. We also assign a
value of 1 month to the 0.2 percent of prison sentences that were less than 1 month.
28 The estimates are robust to alternative sentence values for those not ultimately sen-
tenced to incarceration. For example, imputing a 0.1-month sentence to those with no
incarceration slightly increases the estimated racial disparity at the fourth decile and has no
noticeable effect above it.
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pears to simply be a locational shift parameter for the conditional sen-
tence distribution. That is, the conditional effect of race is approxi-
mately 9 percent, and we fail to reject the hypothesis that the disparity is
constant across the estimated deciles of the conditional distribution. If
there is no heterogeneity in the parameter of interest, then the estimate at
the conditional median is a consistent estimator of the conditional mean
effect. In fact, one sees a similar pattern of disparity in OLS regressions of
sentence length, although the estimated disparities are larger ðtable A1Þ.
The inclusion of arrest characteristics cuts the unconditional estimate of
mean disparity in half. The inclusion of the full set of controls further
reduces it to a quarter of the raw disparity. However, an unexplained gap of
approximately 7 months remains.29
C. Alternative Explanations
The estimates presented above include an extremely rich set of controls.
However, in the absence of experimental variation, it is still possible that
the racial disparity we document is the result of an unobserved omitted
factor that is correlated with race. Below we consider the leading potential
alternative explanations for the racial disparity in sentences. Table 4 con-
tains alternative specifications of the median regression, while figure 3
presents a graphical representation of the estimates at each of the deciles
29 These estimates are fromOLS regressions of sentences ðmeasured inmonthsÞ with the
same covariates as the quantile regressions.
TABLE 3
Black-White Log Sentence Disparity
Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
1. No controls .993** .721** .711** .588** .588** .588**
½.212 ½.0692 ½.0723 ½.0626 ½.0618 ½.0590
2. Offense characteristics .312** .340** .280** .241** .256** .245**
½.0556 ½.0493 ½.0403 ½.0359 ½.0350 ½.0524
3. Offense and criminal history .127** .131** .151** .149** .16** .157**
½.041 ½.030 ½.030 ½.032 ½.035 ½.032
4. Full set of controls .096** .087** .086** .081** .097** .101**
½.025 ½.020 ½.017 ½.018 ½.022 ½.022
Note.—N 5 36,649. Each cell contains the coefficient on black from a separate quantile
regression. In rows 3 and 4, the point estimate is themedian point estimate across the 15 hot
deck imputations of criminal history and education. Row 2 includes arrest offense and mul-
tidefendant case indicators. Row 3 includes the controls in row 2 along with indicators for
the defendant’s criminal history ðcategory 1 is the excluded categoryÞ. Row 4 includes all of
the controls from row 3 along with defendant age, education dummies, and dummies for the
federal district. Standard errors block bootstrapped by district are in brackets.
1 Significant at the 10 percent level.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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beginning with the fourth for the same alternative specifications. For com-
parison purposes, table 4, column A, and figure 3a reproduce the main
estimates from table 3 ðrow 4Þ.
First, the hot deck imputation implicitly assumes that criminal history
and education are missing at random within race by arrest offense by age
group by marital status cells and thus have the same conditional distri-
bution in the cases inwhich they are and are not observed.30This is a strong
TABLE 4
Black-White Log Sentence Disparity at the Median: Supplementary Analyses
Alternate Criminal History Imputations
A. Main ðTable 3,
Row 4Þ
B. Below Mean
for Arrest
Offense
C. Extreme Criminal
History Bounds
Lower Upper
Black .087** .082** .052* .112**
½.020 ½.020 ½.023 ½.024
Observations 36,659 36,659 36,659 36,659
Additional Case and Arrestee Characteristics
D. No Prearrest
Indictment
E. Original
Arrest
Codes
F. Police Notes
Available Included
Black .088** .087** .058* .061**
½.022 ½.020 ½.024 ½.023
Observations 21,313 36,086 18,096 18,096
G. County
Characteristics
H. Counsel Type
Recorded Included
Black .089** .137** .138**
½.019 ½.030 ½.028
Observations 36,659 13,838 13,838
I. Hispanic
J. Include
NoncitizensRecorded Included
Black .091** .105** .096**
½.018 ½.017 ½.021
Observations 28,492 28,492 43,309
Note.—Each cell contains the black coefficient from a separate median regression. All
regressions include all of the control variables from table 3, row 4. Each point estimate is
the median point estimate across the 15 hot deck imputations of criminal history and
education. Standard errors block bootstrapped by district are in brackets.
1 Significant at the 10 percent level.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
30 Our preferred assumption is that criminal history is “missing at random”within cells. As a
rough approximation, this assumption is reasonable. Over 90 percent of the arrestees with
unobserved criminal histories are declinations, dismissals, and acquittals, any of which can
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assumption. Prosecutors have access to federal databases, and it is likely
that they have at least some knowledgeof arrestees’ criminal histories prior
to the official compilation of the presentencing report. This knowledge
could influence their decisions. We observe criminal history and educa-
tion only in cases that proceed to sentencing on a nonpetty offense, and
it is possible that the likelihood of such sentencing could be affected by
the arrestee’s criminal history or education. To test the robustness of the
estimates to relaxing the missing-at-random assumption, we replace it
with the assumption that cases that do not proceed to sentencing on a
nonpetty charge are, on average, less severe, conditional on the ob-
servables, than those that do. Hot deck imputation for unobserved crim-
inal history and education within race, age, marital status, and arrest
offense cells is still employed, but the matches are further constrained to
cases that have below-average sentences for their arrest offense. This subset
of cases may involve relatively less serious conduct and also has a sub-
stantially lower distribution of criminal histories. The resulting estimates
of racial disparity are only slightly lower than those in the main specifica-
tion ðcol. B of table 4; fig. 2bÞ.
We next test if even more extreme assumptions about the unobserved
criminal histories are capable of explaining the observed racial disparity in
sentences.31 To that end, we reestimate the racial disparity in sentences
under the two most extreme possible criminal history assumptions. First,
we impute themaximum criminal history category ðcategory 6Þ to all black
defendants with missing criminal history and the minimum category
ðcategory 1Þ to all white defendants with missing criminal history. This is
equivalent to an assumption that black defendants are less likely to face
sentencing onanonpetty offense conditional on their criminal history and
will generate a lower bound on the estimates of the racial disparity. To
generate an upper bound, we reverse the assumption and assign the
minimum possible criminal history score to all black defendants with
missing criminal histories and the maximum possible score for the white
defendants with missing criminal histories. Under these extreme as-
sumptions, the conditional effect of race at the median ranges from 5 to
11 percent ðtable 4, col. C; fig. 3cÞ. The magnitude of the coefficients is
affected, but the unexplained racial disparity remains economically and
statistically significant. The assumptions that produced these bounds are
unrealistic. The average racial difference in criminal histories observed in
our data is only approximately one criminal history category. Thus, even
31 We focus on criminal history rather than education because education is not a substantial
explanator of the race gap in sentences, and it is also less likely that prosecutors would know
the defendant’s education level before the presentence investigation report is issued.
occur in either “more serious” or “less serious” cases because of weaknesses in the evidence.
The alternative “less serious” assumption is probablymore realistic for the 279 arrestees whose
criminal history is unobserved because they were convicted of a petty offense.
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FIG. 3.—Impact of race on sentence length at each decile. Each point is the black coeffi-
cient at that decile from a separate quantile regression of log sentence length following the
specification in row 4 of table 3.
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the most extreme assumptions about unobserved differences in criminal
history are incapable of explaining all the racial disparity in sentences.
We next consider other aspects of black defendants’ cases that could
explain their higher sentences—in particular, the possibility that dif-
ferences in criminal conduct are not completely captured by the arrest
offense. One concern is that in some cases the arrest offense may not be
free from prosecutorial influence. However, the estimates are robust to
excluding cases in which the indictment preceded the arrest ðtable 4,
col. D; fig. 3dÞ. These are the cases in which prosecutors are most likely
to have played a substantial role in the investigation prior to the arrest
and may have thus influenced the recording of the arrest offense. Next,
while the arrest offense codes are fairly specific, there is still variance in
severity within a given arrest offense. If black defendants committed
more serious versions of the same arrest offenses, that could explain
their higher sentences. Our main estimates group certain infrequently
used arrest offense codes together with more common ones on the basis
of legal similarity. The estimates are robust to the use of the original
arrest codes ðtable 4, col. E; fig. 3eÞ. We further tested the possibility of
omitted nuances in the offenses by adding indicators for whether the
additional written description of the arrest offense mentioned guns,
other weapons, drugs, child victims, police victims, conspiracy, or rack-
eteering in the arrest description—all of which are potential indicators
of greater offense severity. The written description is available only for
arrests prior to fiscal year 2008.32 Within the subsample for which the
description is available, the addition of these indicators does not change
the disparity estimates ðcompare the two estimates in table 4, col. F, and
the corresponding graph in fig. 3f ; the two solid lines are the estimates
of the black coefficient at each decile for this subsample with and with-
out the arrest description indicators included in the regressionÞ.
Race and socioeconomic status are highly correlated in the United
States, raising the possibility that the apparentdisparity in sentences results
from socioeconomic status rather than from race. We do not directly
observe the defendant’s income, but the estimates are robust to the
inclusion of the unemployment rate, poverty rate, and per capita income
ðas well as the crime rateÞ of the defendant’s county ðtable 4, col. G; fig. 3gÞ.
The estimates are also robust to the inclusion of an indicator for whether
the defendant was represented by publically appointed counsel ð“counsel
type”Þ, a good proxy for poverty. Having publicly appointed counsel does
not explain any of the racial disparity in sentencing at any decile within
the subsample for which counsel type is recorded ðtable 4, col. H; fig. 3hÞ.
32 The base estimates are lower for this subsample. The written notes are available only
for those arrested in fiscal year 2007 or earlier, and disparity appears to have grown over the
3-year period.
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The arrest data include race, but not ethnicity. Hispanics therefore
cannot be separately identified in the arrest data but can be identified in
the sentencing data. In the arrest data, 94 percent of those identified as
Hispanic in sentencing data are classified as white. If Hispanics receive
longer sentences than non-Hispanic whites, this could mean that our
approach understates the amount of racial disparity in sentences between
non-Hispanic white and black defendants. Controlling for Hispanic eth-
nicity results in a small but statistically insignificant increase in the esti-
mated disparity at themedian ðfrom 9 to 10 percentÞwithin the subsample
of cases for which ethnicity is recorded ðcompare the estimates in table 4,
col. I, and the lines in fig. 3iÞ.
The main sample excludes non-US citizens. Noncitizens are pre-
dominantly white and Hispanic and may be more disadvantaged than
white US citizen arrestees. The exclusion of a subset of white arrestees
who might be expected to face worse outcomes could bias the estimated
racial disparity upward. However, the estimated racial disparity in sen-
tences is, if anything, slightly larger when noncitizens are added ðtable 4,
col. J; fig. 3jÞ.33
D. Procedural Mechanisms: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
The preceding analysis estimated racial disparity conditional on defen-
dant and case characteristics when the arrestee entered the justice sys-
tem. Next, we ask whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
capable of explaining the remaining black-white sentence disparity. We
reestimate equation ð2Þ adding controls for how the prosecutor chose to
handle the case. Specifically, we include the statutory sentencing range
of the initial charges chosen by the prosecutor: the statutory maximum
sentence and an indicator for whether the charges carry a mandatory
minimum sentence. We find that prosecutors’ charging decisions, and
particularly the mandatory minimum decision, are capable of explain-
ing at least half of the otherwise unexplained racial disparity. Adding
the statutory maximum of the initial charges along with an indicator for
the presence of a charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence re-
duces the coefficients on race by at least half ðtable 5, row 2Þ. Further,
it appears that this reduction is primarily coming from the presence of
charges carrying mandatory minimum sentences. The estimates are sim-
ilar when the statutory maximum is removed ðrow 3Þ, suggesting that the
mandatory minimum variable is the most important charging decision
in terms of its effects on sentencing disparity. The statutory maximum
does have some explanatory power when it is the only charging measure
33 Theestimates arealso robust to the additionof controls formarital status. In addition, the
estimated disparities are not confined to any one region of the country ðsuch as the SouthÞ.
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added, but not as much as the mandatory minimum, and it does not con-
tribute additional explanatory power once the mandatory minimum is
already included in the regression ðrows 2 and 3Þ.34
Thus, the prosecutor’s decision to bring a mandatory minimum charge
alone appears capable of explaining more than half of the black-white
sentencing disparity that was not otherwise explained by precharge char-
acteristics. This is perhaps not surprising given the very large unexplained
racial disparity in the rate at which mandatory minimum charges are
brought ðsee table 2, col. 2Þ. Still, the effect is striking given our conser-
vative method of coding ambiguous charges. Many federal charges do not
carry mandatory minimums unless specific factual circumstances are pres-
ent. When there was any uncertainty about whether an initial charge
carried a mandatory minimum sentence, we assumed that it did not carry
one. Thus, our initial mandatory minimum charge variable underestimates
the true prevalence of such charges. The extent of this underestimation
cannot be directly measured with the initial charge data. Data on final
charges suggest that it is not trivial. Our coding identifies 7.5 percent of
TABLE 5
Black-White Log Sentence Disparity after Accounting for Charge Severity
Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Main specification ðtable 3, row 4Þ .096** .087** .086** .081** .097** .101**
½.025 ½.020 ½.017 ½.018 ½.022 ½.022
With statutory maximum of
charges and mandatory
minimum charge indicator .053* .044* .032* .0271 .034* .049*
½.023 ½.019 ½.016 ½.016 ½.016 ½.020
With mandatory minimum
charge indicator .045* .043* .03 .025 .0351 .053*
½.020 ½.021 ½.019 ½.016 ½.019 ½.021
With mandatory minimum
conviction indicator .057** .053** .039* .032* .040* .049**
½.022 ½.019 ½.016 ½.015 ½.018 ½.018
With mandatory minimum
present at sentencing
indicator ðUSSC measureÞ .0361 .031 .02 .003 .002 2.008
½.019 ½.020 ½.020 ½.016 ½.016 ½.017
Note.—N 5 36,659. Each cell contains the coefficient on black from a separate quantile
regression. Each point estimate is the median point estimate across the 15 hot deck imputa-
tions of criminal history and education. Standard errors block bootstrapped by district are in
brackets.
1 Significant at the 10 percent level.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
34 This is also true if one uses alternative measures of charge severity, based either on the
guidelines sentence for the initial charge or on past actual mean sentences for the charges
in question. Neither measure had additional explanatory power when the mandatory
minimum was included, although each had some explanatory power on its own.
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cases as including a final charge that carries a mandatory minimum, while
the USSC data ðwhich are error freeÞ indicate that 14.7 percent of cases
contain such a charge. If a similar error rate also applies to our identi-
fication of initial charges carrying mandatory minimums, the true manda-
tory minimum rate in initial charges could be approximately 22 percent
rather than the 11.4 percent that we observe.
All else equal, the presence of a mandatory minimum is positively
correlated with both sentence length and being black.35 Therefore, the
error in the mandatory minimum variable will create upward bias in the
coefficient of interest, the remaining unexplained racial disparity. Esti-
mates using data on final mandatory minimums confirm the direction
of this bias and are suggestive of its likely magnitude. Rows 4 and 5 of
table 5 replace our mandatory minimum initial charge indicator with
indicators of the final mandatory minimum based on our coding of the
conviction data ðrow 4Þ and the USSC’s recording of the mandatory
minimum. The estimated racial disparity in sentences ismarginally larger
but statistically indistinguishable when our coding of a mandatory min-
imum initial charge is replaced with our coding of a mandatory mini-
mum charge being present at conviction ðrow 4Þ. In contrast, when the
USSC’s coding of the finalmandatoryminimum is used ðrow 5Þ, the black
coefficient is reduced to a statistically insignificant 3 percent at the me-
dian and is close to zero or even negative at the top three deciles. This
suggests that our conservative coding leads us to underestimate manda-
tory minimums’ role in explaining sentencing disparity; mandatory min-
imums may in fact be capable of explaining nearly all of the otherwise-
unexplained black-white sentence gap.36
E. Drug and Child Pornography Cases
The main analyses exclude drug and child pornography cases, which
are a large component of the federal docket. We reestimate our main
35 This is true for our coding of mandatory minimums, and the USSC data indicate that
it is also true for the mandatory minimums that our coding misses.
36 Formally deriving bounds for the OLS estimate of the black coefficient ðtable A1Þ given
the errors in our identification of initial charges carrying mandatory minimums leads to a
similar conclusion. The general bounds on the black coefficient are given by gb 2 ðdb=b r Þ and
gb 2 dbb
d ðKlepper and Leamer 1984; Klepper 1988; Erikson 1993; Bollinger 1996Þ, where gb
is the black coefficient from the regression of sentences on all the controls except the initial
mandatory minimum indicator ðtable A1, col. 4Þ, and db is the black coefficient from the
regression of the initial mandatory minimum charge indicator on all the controls ð0.052Þ.
The variables b d and b r are, respectively, the coefficients from the direct and reverse regres-
sions of the residuals from the separate linear projections of sentences on all the controls
except mandatory minimum charging and the mandatory minimum initial charge indicator
on all the other controls ð60.15 and 0.0015Þ. The resulting bounds on the black coefficient
are227.6 to 3.8 months. Working with the upper bound, if one assumes that the correlation
between the mismeasured and true mandatory minimum indicator is the same as the cor-
relation between the two measures at final charges ðr5 :6358Þ, then it would be further
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analyses on a sample expanded to include drug and child pornography
cases ðtable 6, row 1Þ. The pattern of racial disparity is similar to that
found in the main estimation. The black coefficient appears to be slightly
larger in these cases ð11–13 percentÞ, but this could be due to arrest of-
fense being a weaker proxy for the severity of underlying criminal behavior
in the absence of information on drug quantity at arrest.37 In order to see
whether prosecutors’ charging decisions are also capable of explaining
racial disparity in this broader sample, we again add the presence of
charges carrying mandatory minimums as a control. Because the AOUSC
charge data are inadequate to determine whether the initial drug or child
pornography charge carried a mandatory minimum sentence, we instead
use an indicator for the USSC’s recording of whether the final charge did.
When this indicator is included in the estimation, the unexplained racial
disparity is substantially reduced to between 4 and 7 percent. This suggests
that disparities in mandatory minimum charging are an important con-
tributor to racial disparity in sentences in these cases as well.38
V. Discussion
The estimates presented above document substantial racial disparity in
federal criminal sentences, across the sentence distribution and across a
wide variety of samples and specifications. Furthermore, the way prose-
cutors choose to charge cases appears to be an important factor in these
37 The EOUSA investigation file records the type and quantity of drugs seized at arrest.
Unfortunately, there are serious defects in the quantity field beginning in 2004. But for the
last three years in which quantity information is available, fiscal years 2001–3, there is no
racial disparity in the average quantity seized ðas measured in “marijuana equivalents” as
defined by federal sentencing lawÞ, conditional on arrest offense and other prearrest co-
variates, and adding quantity information to the arrest offense controls does not signifi-
cantly change the racial disparity estimates for sentences in that period. Arrest quantity
differences thus would likely explain the estimated racial disparities in table 6 only if black
arrestees’ distribution of quantities grew substantially relative to those of white arrestees
between that period and fiscal years 2006–8, the years of our sample.
38 A similar pattern emerges if one instead limits the estimates to drug and child por-
nography cases alone. Across the deciles the overall estimate of racial disparity ranges from
10 to 15 percent, and the inclusion of a control for the presence of a mandatory minimum
charge at sentencing reduces the estimated disparity by approximately one-third. The
remaining racial disparity after controlling for the mandatory minimum is larger in the
drug and child pornography sample. The reason may be partly that in drug cases, the mere
existence of a mandatory minimum does not capture as much of the important charging
variation: most drug defendants face some mandatory minimum, so the most important
factor may be the length of that minimum. Replacing the mandatory minimum indicator
with a categorical variable that differentiates mandatory minimums by length further cuts
the remaining unexplained disparities by nearly half. In contrast, substituting the cate-
gorical version for the indicator has little effect on the results for the main sample.
reduced to gb 2 dbðb d=rÞ, which is 2 months ðthe estimated disparity at the median condi-
tional on the USSC indicator, table 5, row 5, corresponds to 1.95 monthsÞ.
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disparities. The findings concerning mandatory minimums’ sentencing
consequences are particularly striking given that such charges, according
to our coding, are brought in only 11.4 percent of cases in our main
sample ðand only 16.4 percent of black defendants’ casesÞ. It is notable
that disparities within a type of charge that does not apply to most cases
could explain such a large fraction of the otherwise-unexplained dis-
parities in the total pool. However, the unexplained disparities that we
measure ðas well as the contribution of prosecutorial decisions to those
disparitiesÞ are open to competing interpretations, andwe consider some
leading alternatives here.
First, while the arrest offense is the best proxy available for the de-
fendant’s actual criminal conduct, it is naturally an imperfect proxy.
Between the detailed arrest codes, the multidefendant flag, and the
written description based on the arresting officer’s notes, the informa-
tion on arrest is fairly rich, and the results also do not appear to be
driven by any particular arresting agency’s cases. But there could still be
factual differences that are not captured by the arrest codes or by the
written description: like prosecutors, officers could choose to describe
the same facts in different ways, and if they do so along racial lines, that
divergence could bias racial disparity estimates that are conditioned on
the arrest data.39
However, the existing literature on law enforcement suggests that the
direction of any bias introduced by arrest discretion is likely downward.
Studies in numerous contexts have pointed to the possibility of police
TABLE 6
Black-White Log Sentence Disparity: All Case Types
Including Drugs and Child Pornography
Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Main specification ðtable 3, row 4Þ .132** .127** .121** .117** .113** .114**
½.020 ½.019 ½.016 ½.016 ½.015 ½.015
With mandatory minimum present
at sentencing indicator
ðUSSC measureÞ .070** .066** .062** .053** .048** .042**
½.018 ½.018 ½.017 ½.014 ½.013 ½.014
Note.—N5 71,698. Each cell contains the coefficient on black from a separate quantile
regression. The point estimate is the median point estimate across the 15 hot deck impu-
tations of criminal history and education. Standard errors block bootstrapped by district
are in brackets.
1 Significant at the 10 percent level.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
39 For example, if police are sympathetic to black arrestees ðor believe that prosecutors
and judges treat them too harshlyÞ and soften their arrest reports accordingly, then pros-
ecutors could appear to charge black defendants more harshly conditional on arrest of-
fense but be charging them equally conditional on true criminal behavior.
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bias against minority suspects ðe.g., Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007Þ,
although there is considerable debate as to whether these are driven by
statistical or preference-based discrimination ðe.g., Knowles, Persico,
and Todd 2001; Antonovics and Knight 2009Þ. If federal agents are
harsher on black suspects, one would expect them to record, on average,
more offenses for blacks relative to their true conduct and to up-code
offenses whenever possible. Then, prosecutors’ cases against black de-
fendants, conditional on arrest offense, should be weaker, and the esti-
mated results may understate the “true” race gaps in charging ðor at least
are unlikely to overstate themÞ.40
Another possibility is that race is correlated with unobserved char-
acteristics of the defendant ðrather than the caseÞ that influence pros-
ecutorial choices. Candidates include poverty and, relatedly, defense
counsel quality. But the inclusion of counsel type and other socioeco-
nomic controls ðeducation, marital status, and county characteristicsÞ
does not reduce the estimates of racial disparity in charging or sen-
tencing. This is less surprising than it may appear, given the high quality
of federal public defenders ðsee Posner and Yoon 2011Þ.41
While other unobserved differences cannot be ruled out, there re-
mains the possibility that the observed disparities are driven by dis-
crimination, which could be either statistical or preference based. The
mechanism for preference-based discrimination might well be implicit
biases such as racial disparities in empathy that drive selective leniency
rather than animus. Statistical discrimination might, for instance, be
based on expectations concerning criminal recidivism ðsee Curry and
Klumpp 2009Þ. One might, however, expect the effect of beliefs about
these nonrace factors and their correlation with race to vary across the
conditional distribution rather than produce the surprisingly stable race
parameter we document.
Preference-based and statistical discrimination cannot be conclusively
disentangled using these data. Notably, however, if any form of pur-
poseful race-based decision making is involved, none of these mecha-
nisms are legally permissible. Otherwise-unconstitutional discrimination
cannot be legally defended on the basis of statistical generalizations
about group traits, regardless of their empirical support ð J.E.B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 1994Þ. In addition, statistically discrimi-
nating prosecutors may not have the opportunity to modify charges as
40 While the conclusions of the policing studies vary, they at least do not generally
suggest discrimination favoring blacks. One cannot rule out the possibility that the reverse
pattern holds within the sample; federal agents may differ from the state and local police
generally studied in the policing literature. But the results at the charging and sentencing
stages do not, at least, appear driven by any particular enforcement agencies’ patterns.
41 In contrast, in state courts that have less effective public defender programs, any racial
disparities might be expected to be compounded by socioeconomic disparities.
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they update their initial beliefs about the individual or case, as em-
ployers can do in the labor market ðAltonji and Pierret 2001Þ. Criminal
cases are often processed quickly, with little chance for personal inter-
action between prosecutors and defendants, and because Department of
Justice policy discourages charge bargaining and requires the approval
of a supervisor to reduce charges in plea agreements, it may be costly or
difficult for prosecutors to change charges even if they do update their
beliefs.
Finally, these disparity estimates do not include structural inequality.
For example, they do not include the racial disparity in sentences due
to black arrestees being more likely to live in federal districts that give
higher sentences or be arrested for crimes that are associated with longer
sentences. Both could exist for numerous reasons unrelated to race. How-
ever, it is also possible that the racial makeup of arrestees directly affects
how punitive the justice system is in particular districts or the relative stat-
utory penalties for offenses. Likewise, the choice to weigh criminal history
heavily in the guidelines sentencing scheme, while grounded in a variety
of policy considerations, has a substantial disparate impact on black de-
fendants.
VI. Conclusion
Using rich new linked data that allow us to address the sample selection
problems and other limitations that have pervaded prior research, this
paper provides robust evidence that black male federal arrestees ulti-
mately face longer prison terms than whites arrested for the same of-
fenses with the same prior records. This disparity arises from disparities
in the intensive but not in the extensive margin of incarceration. Ob-
served case and defendant characteristics are capable of completely ex-
plaining the large raw disparities in incarceration, but not in the length
of incarceration. The conditional black-white sentence disparity is ap-
proximately 9 percent at each decile in our main sample.42 If the disparity
is 9 percent across the entire conditional distribution of these cases, then
the conditional mean effect of race is also approximately 9 percent.43
There are currently 95,400 black men incarcerated in federal facilities.
Eliminating a 9 percent black premium would ultimately reduce the
steady-state number of black males in federal incarceration by nearly
8,000, and most of this reduction could potentially be achieved by simply
42 Owing to the aforementioned limitations of the drug case arrest offense data, the
estimates from the sample excluding drugs are our preferred estimates. They are also the
most conservative.
43 The estimate from the median regression will also be a consistent estimator of the
conditional mean effect if the conditional sentence distribution is symmetric.
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eliminating the disparity in mandatory minimum charges.44 To place this
number in the context of recent reforms, when the US Sentencing Com-
mission retroactively applied the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ðwhich
reduced the disparity in the treatment of crack vs. powder cocaineÞ, it
shortened the sentences of 7,381 men and women of all races ðUS Sen-
tencing Commission 2013Þ. The Bureau of Prisons estimates that it costs
$29,027 per year to incarcerate an additional prisoner ðCongressional
Research Service 2013Þ. The direct federal budgetary savings of reducing
the prison stock by 8,000 men would be approximately $230 million per
year. These calculations are likely conservative because they apply the
smaller disparity estimate from the main ðnondrugÞ sample to all case
types. If the disparity in sentences is instead the larger estimated disparity
for all case types, 12.7 percent at the median ðtable 6Þ, then eliminating it
would reduce the steady-state number of black men in federal prison by
almost 11,000. Furthermore, the rapidly growing prison population ðUS
General Accounting Office 2013Þ means that the number of individuals
expected tobe affectedby thesedisparities will only growover time. Finally,
all these estimates exclude any structural disparities that could themselves
be partly due to race.
In the federal system, more than half of the black-white sentence dis-
parity that is unexplained by the arrest offense and offenders’ prior traits
can be explained by initial charge decisions, particularly the prosecutors’
decision to file charges that carry “mandatory minimum” sentences. Ce-
teris paribus, they do so 65 percent more often against black defendants.
These findings highlight the empirical importance of obtaining measures
of criminal conduct that are not themselves the product of the legal pro-
cess. They also suggest that recent policy and scholarly debates that have
focusedheavily on thedisparity risks associatedwith judicial discretionmay
have overlooked one of themost important actors: the federal prosecutor.
Moreover, while our findings concern only the federal system, our ap-
proach could be employed in future research in state settings if arrest,
charging, and sentencing data can be linked. The size of racial dispari-
ties and the role of mandatory minimums at the state level are important
44 This calculation is based on a reduction in black male prison stocks to 1/1.09 of their
current level. As of November 2013, there are approximately 73,000 black male inmates
incarcerated in federal Bureau of Prisons facilities ð78,241 black prisoners, 93.3 percent of
whomaremale; see http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jspÞ. In addition, the FederalDetention
Program administered by the US Marshals’ Service has approximately 22,400 black male
detainees ðassuming race and gender breakdown parallel to the Bureau of Prisons’; see
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-fpd-justification.pdfÞ. Reducing this
95,400 black male prisoner stock to 1/1.09 of its current level would free approximately
7,900 prisoners. The estimates here represent the per-year benefits of changes that are sus-
tained over sufficient time to affect the sentences of all persons in prison; or, conversely, it
represents the counterfactual reduction in current prison stocks if current black male pris-
oners had received sentences averaging 1/1.09 of their actual lengths.
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areas for future research. Mandatory minimums exist in every state
ðStemen, Rengifo, andWilson 2006; Tonry 2011Þ and are often described
as a major contributor to the fivefold growth in US incarceration rates
since the 1970s ðClear and Austin 2009; Blumstein 2011Þ. If similar un-
explained racial disparities in sentence outcomes exist in state systems,
which process over 90 percent of criminal cases, eliminating them would
have social and budgetary consequences that are approximately 10 times
as large as those in the federal system. One out of every nine black men
between the ages of 18 and 35 is currently incarcerated ðPew Center on
the States 2008Þ. If one assumes that all black male sentences in federal
and state court face an average race premium of 9 percent, eliminating
this disparity would ultimately move nearly 1 percent of all the black men
under 35 in the United States from prisons and jails back to the com-
munity.
Appendix
TABLE A1
OLS Regressions of Prison Sentence Length ðMonthsÞ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ ð7Þ
Black 26.80** 14.54** 9.615** 6.920** 3.846** 3.923** 1.315
½2.401 ½1.773 ½1.617 ½1.016 ½.972 ½.907 ½.883
Multidefendant 7.631** 9.464** 8.599** 5.115** 5.596** 3.774**
½1.587 ½1.524 ½1.305 ½1.220 ½1.157 ½1.024
Criminal
history 2 3.565* 4.596** 2.9631 3.280* 3.146*
½1.240 ½1.225 ½1.264 ½1.164 ½1.032
Criminal
history 3 7.498** 8.117** 7.860** 7.932** 8.142**
½1.115 ½1.067 ½.927 ½.894 ½.890
Criminal
history 4 21.87** 21.64** 22.17** 22.35** 19.46**
½1.392 ½1.276 ½1.319 ½1.271 ½1.062
Criminal
history 5 29.14** 29.70** 30.21** 30.83** 28.56**
½1.393 ½1.300 ½1.369 ½1.348 ½1.284
Criminal
history 6 61.87** 61.34** 59.82** 60.50** 49.59**
½2.527 ½2.526 ½2.526 ½2.606 ½1.687
Mandatory
minimum
initial charge 60.15**
½2.717
Mandatory
minimum
conviction 85.73**
½3.303
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